Implementation of hybrid artificial intelligence technique to detect covert channels in new generation network protocol IPv6 by Salih, A et al.
Implementation of Hybrid Artificial Intelligence Technique to Detect 
Covert Channels Attack in New Generation Internet Protocol IPv6 
Abdulrahman Salih1, Xiaoqi Ma2, and Evtim Peytchev3 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Intrusion detection systems offer monolithic way to detect attacks through monitoring, searching for 
abnormal characteristics and malicious behavior in network communications.  Cyber-attack is performed through 
using covert channel which currently, is one of the most sophisticated challenges facing network security systems. 
Covert channel is used to ex / infiltrate classified information from legitimate targets, consequently, this 
manipulation violates network security policy and privacy. The New Generation Internet Protocol version 6 
(IPv6) has certain security vulnerabilities and need to be addressed using further advanced techniques. Fuzzy 
rule is implemented to classify different network attacks as an advanced machine learning technique, meanwhile, 
Genetic algorithm is considered as an optimization technique to obtain the ideal fuzzy rule.  This paper suggests 
a novel hybrid covert channel detection system implementing two Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques; Fuzzy 
Logic and Genetic Algorithm (FLGA) to gain sufficient and optimal detection rule against covert channel. Our 
approach counters sophisticated network unknown attacks through an advanced analysis of deep packet 
inspection. Results of our suggested system offer high detection rate of 97.7% and a better performance in 
comparison to previous tested techniques.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The growth of dependability on the Internet in every day services made people 
susceptible to all kinds of cyber-attacks such as; fraud, spam, phishing and all types of 
unauthorized access through ID theft. Despite the fact that the security issues in IPv6 were 
addressed and improved, other issues are still need to be investigated due to the inherited design 
vulnerability and the incomplete implementation process of this protocol in all operating 
systems (Zander et al. 2006). The protocol itself is already over a decade old, however its 
approvals early stages reaching 10 % according to latest statistics performed (Salih et al. 2015) 
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The low and inevitable acceptance of IPv6 results in an insufficient understanding of 
its security properties (Martin & Dunn, 2007), (Supriyanto et al. 2012) IPv6 had no 
cryptographic protection when deployed and even the successful deployment of Internet 
Protocol Security (IPsec) within IPv6 cannot give any guarantee or additional security against 
hidden channel attacks (Zander et al. 2006), (Supriyanto et al. 2012). 
    The protocol dimension representing the removed, changed and new values in the 
header fields according to its suggested new design by the Interned Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) and Request For Comments (RFC 2460) (Martin & Dunn, 2007), (Zander 
et al. 2006). IPv6 header fields as shown in Table 1 have potential to carry anomaly attacks 
depending on the modified value of each field in the packet transmission over the net 
(Supriyanto et al. 2012) (Choudhary, 2009), (Wendzel et al ., 2015). 
          There are two main types of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) techniques can 
perform security analysis; the anomaly detection method and the misuse detection (signature 
based) method. Anomaly detection depends on the conventional profile in order to identify any 
abnormality in the traffic, whereas signature based detection uses signature identification 
technique to detect attacks (Gomez & Dasgupta, 2002), (Liu & La, 2009). Interestingly, three 
important techniques are used by misused detection approach: 
 
1. Signature-based approaches 
2. Rule-based approaches or also called expert systems. 
3. Genetic Algorithms (GA) 
 
Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) is a vital component and an 
integral part of IPv6 and should be fully implemented by every IPv6 node according to RFC 
(4443), however this particular aspect obviously means hidden channels (Martin & Dunn, 
2007). ICMPv6 reports errors encountered in processing packets (Choudhary, 2009) and it does 
other Internet-layer functions such as; diagnostics. It produces two types of messages: 
Information Notification and Error Notification. It  uses Type and Code fields to differentiate 
services, in which both are vulnerable to be misused by bad guys to perform different attacks 
i.e. denial of Service (DoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and spoofing attacks (Martin & Dunn, 
2007), (Supriyanto et al. 2012), (Choudhary, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper, we suggest a new hybrid approach using fuzzy logic and genetic algorithm 
to detect network storage covert channels in IPv6. The process analyses the IPv6 and ICMPv6 
header fields values and explains the viability of holding strange values which consequently 
indicating an abnormal behavior and possible covert channel existence.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 describes briefly some related 
works, Section 3 discusses the proposed research methodology, the theory and techniques 
ID Field Covert Channel Bandwidth 
 
1 
Traffic  Class Set a false traffic class 8bits/packet 
2 Flow Label Set a false flow label 20 bits/packet 
3 
Payload 
Length 
Increase value to insert 
extra data 
Various 
4 Next Header 
Set a valid value to add 
an extra extension header 
Various 
5 Hop limit Increase/decrease value ≈ 1 bit/packet 
6 
Source 
Address 
Set a false source address 16 bytes/packet 
Table 1. Extracted IPv6 Header Fields and 
Their Format Values 
 
 
implemented, Section 4 discusses the experiments and initial results obtained from the testing 
phases, and finally Section 5 discusses Conclusions and Future work.  
Our proposed security system offers a better performance in high accuracy and prediction of 
the future unknown attacks against legitimate targets. 
 
2. RELATED WORK  
  
 Previous researchers in network anomaly detection focused on IPv4 (Zander et al. 
2007)), (Sohn et al. 2003), (Vivek & Kalimuthu, 2014), however fewer researchers were 
concerned about security vulnerabilities of the new generation protocol IPv6 due to its 
incomplete implementation. Hidden information could be transferred very easy in the data 
section of the packet due to the large size and it’s relatively unstructured in comparison to 
headers. 
Salih et al. (2015) argue that covert channels could be encoded in the unused or reserved 
bits in the packet header frame, these unused header fields are designed for future protocol 
improvements, as they will be dismissed by IDS and Firewalls (Zander et al. 2007), (Supriyanto 
et al. 2012), (Liu & Lai, 2009) furthermore this exception caused by the presence of specific 
values in protocol standards (Martin & Dunn, 2007), (Zander et al. 2006). Different machine 
learning techniques have been used in IDS in a revolutionary status since 1990’s. Genetic 
algorithm started to be used in IDS since 1995 when Crosbie and Spafford (Jongsuebsuk et al. 
20013), applied a hybrid approach of a multiple agent and Genetic Programming (GP) to detect 
network anomalies. GA is used in many proposed approaches in intrusion detection techniques 
due to its intensive capabilities. 
Sohn et al. (2003) mentioned the Support Vector Machine in passive warden to detect 
TCP anomaly within the IP ID and TCP ISN. This method was not preferable for well under-
stood and explicit features in his proposed IP IDs and ISNs steganography hidden 
communication channels, furthermore SVM can only identify simple aspects as it could 
unlikely detect complex structure deployed in TCP/IPv6 fields and their inter-dependencies. 
Gomez and Dasgupta (2002) suggested fuzzy and genetic algorithm to detect and 
classify behavioral intrusion suing a bench mark data KDD99 dataset. They used evolutionary 
techniques and genetic algorithm which managed to classify 4 attack classes and one normal 
class. 
    Salih et al. (2015) proposed new Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA) with an 
enhanced machine learning technique; Nave Bayes classifier to detect covert channels in IPv6. 
The authors used enhanced decision trees C4.5 and Information Gain to improve the detection 
rate. Accuracy in this approach was 94% with very low false negative rate. 
  
3. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
 
Different approaches exist for anomaly detection i.e. signature, behavior and protocol 
based detection. Infrequent researchers use machine learning technique to tackle anomaly 
attacks in IPv6 and ICMPv6 due to its incomplete implementation and design complexity 
(Zander et al. 2007). Our approach uses pattern behavior of the header value to determine the 
identified data that has been transferred stealthily by the attacker using covert channels without 
affecting the normal communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm (FGA) 
Genetic Algorithm is an evolutionary Artificial Intelligence (AI) optimization 
technique based on some synthetic keys such as natural selection and genetics (Chen et al. 
2008). Fries (2008) verified that John Holland with his academic colleagues at the University 
of Michigan have invented GA in the 1960s and the 1970s, explained the mechanism behind 
it. GA is based on Darwinians biological principle of evolution: The survival of the fittest. It 
uses three dominant functions; selection, crossover and mutation when optimizing a population 
of candidate solution and to predefine fitness. This algorithm has been successfully 
implemented (Jongsuebsuk et al. 20013), (Hoque et al. 2012) to solve significant collection of 
complex optimization problems when search area is too broad. We propose an enhanced 
version of (Fries, 2008) rule-based algorithm with new and different attacks i.e. covert channels 
in the new generation network protocols IPv6/ICMPv6. The framework uses new simulated 
primary data and NSL-KDD99 benchmark data to verify the results. The suggested Fuzzy 
Genetic Algorithm (FGA) as shown in Figure 1 can perform classification process of two 
classes; normal and anomaly with an improved high detection rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following steps are the main modules in the framework. An overview of the algorithms 
example is given in Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. 
1. Data Capture: Jpcap library packet sniffer is a Java API used to capture simulated 
packets for 2 minutes and dissection process is done to extract the targeted IPv6 and 
ICMPv6 header fields as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ID Header Format Value Type Class 
1 Traffic_Class   Numeric Normal or Covert 
2 Flow_Label  Numeric Normal or Covert 
3 Hop_Limit High,Low, Moderate Normal or Covert 
4 Payload_Length increased,decreased, 
Low 
Normal or Covert 
5 Source_Address Numeric Normal or Covert 
6  Next_Header Numeric Normal or Covert 
7  ICMPv6_Type Numeric Normal or Covert 
8  ICMPv6_Code Numeric Normal or Covert 
9  Reserve_Bit Numeric Normal or Covert 
10 ICMPv6_Payload Numeric Normal or Covert 
Fig 1. Suggested Genetic Algorithm Process to Tackle Covert Channel     
Attacks 
Table 2. Covert Channels Data Format 
and Values 
  
2. Packet Analysis: In this stage the input pcap data after field selection process will go 
through the following sub processes: 
a. Transform and normalize every attribute of the header to some sort of a real 
number giving the range of 0.0 7.0, in which means the minimum and the 
maximum subset values of the attribute from the training data will set in a range 
of 0.0 and 7.0. 
b. After transformation and normalization processes to the attributes and convert 
them to numerical formats, detection rules will be suggested as shown in Table 
3 and Table 4 for all records. The output of the detection rule will be the 
probability of each packet and will count for true positive and true negative. The 
algorithm randomly will create a rule in the initial stage. Then an evolutionary 
concept is used from GA to improve the rule in the training state. 
c. We need to extract the records according to the rules, processing the fitness 
function in equation 1 to calculate the fitness value of each detection rule. 
Occasionally save the highest fitness value which indicates the best rule. 
 
3. Process the evolutionary GA approaches; crossover, mutation and alien to extract the 
next rules.   
 
 
3.2 Fuzzy Algorithm (FA) 
 
In this stage, we encode a fuzzy logic for each attribute, then normalize the subset value 
in a range of 0.0 to 7.0 as mentioned above. The encoded fuzzy logic rule is explained in 
Algorithm 1.  So every single rule will involve 10 blocks of feature values as shown in Table 
2 including the class type at the end of the string, then each rule will be mapped to its 
correspond record as shown in Figure 2. 
       Once we run the rule over a record trying to match each attribute with one block of 
the rule. The probability measurement whether is an attack or not will be performed by the 
parameter of each block using the Fuzzy rules as shown in Algorithm 1. An assessment of the 
probability for each block will be done to predict the likelihood if the record is an attack class 
or a normal class, this is done through taking into account the average of the probability against 
the threshold mean value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then we compare the predicted output against the actual result as in (Fries, 2008), 
furthermore, we will calculate the rule measurement performance through maximization of the 
fitness function using the equation (1) below as its embedded in Algorithm 2. 
 
𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑎
𝐴
 −
𝛽
𝐵
    (1) 
 
 
 
Data Type                                       Value 
Fuzzy Logic 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Symbol         a      b    c    d   
Numeric         2          3         4          5 
Table 3. Fuzzy Logic Detailed For Each 
Data Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Genetic Algorithm 
 Principally, not all attacks against legitimate targets have static patterns, however 
fuzzy logic will detect both types; normal and abnormal. The suggested fuzzy logic as 
shown in Table 3 is encoded into four parameters; a, b, c, and d where 
 
𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑑 
 
According to a trapezoidal shape (Fries, 2008) it is very likely to be capable using the 
parameters to measure the likelihood of the attack through each attribute as described 
shown in Algorithm 3. 
 
 
Algorithm 1.  Fuzzy logic based on (Jongsuebsuk et al. 20013) with some 
modifications and corrections  
 
If (value >a) && (value <b) { 
specificity = (value – a) / (b-a) 
} 
else if ( value ≥ b and value ≤ c) { 
specificity = 1.0; 
} 
else if (value > c and value < d) { 
specificity = (d – value) / (d-c) 
} 
else { 
specificity =0.0 
} 
 
 
3.4 Pre-processing Simulation Data   
 
 We performed two experiment tests on our suggested model; first, we used our 
simulated attack tool built and written in Python programming language (Scapy) to simulate 
attacks in a controlled LAN network lab environment. A sample of the covert channel's attack 
is shown in Table 5, then we captured packets in pcap format using Wireshark. The attribute 
instances from the header values have preprocessed into transformation, discretization 
(Wendzel, 2015), and normalization as mentioned in packet analysis section. According to 
previous research performed by Salih et al (2015) a new limited generation of covert channels 
primary data will be created including instances of different possible attacks in IPv6 and 
Fig 2. Explained String Encoding 
Attribute 1    Attribute 2                                        Attribute n 
a c b d a c b d a c b d 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
 
ICMPv6. The primary data consists of 600.000 records in which contain more than 10 attack 
instances. The objective tested attacks are; Covert channels, Denial of Service (DoS), Probing 
and R2L.  
  
3.5 Evaluation Criteria Parameters  
To evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we used the following three metrics: 
 False positive rate (FPR): ratio of normal packets will be classified as attacks out of the 
total normal packets accounts.  
 False negative rate (FNR): ratio of attacks that misclassified as normal from total numbers, 
but it is attack. 
 True Positive & True Negative (Detection rate): is the total normal and attacks that have 
been correctly classified out of the whole testing data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 2.  Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm is based on algorithm in (Fries, 2008) with 
few corrections. 
 Initial rules (); 
while {  
       For each packet { 
 for each rule { 
                     for each attribute { 
specificity = fuzzy ();   // Algorithm 1 
total= total +specificity;  
} 
        If (totalprob > threshold) 
      class is attack; 
    else 
   class is normal; 
  } 
 compare the predicted result with actual result 
find A, B, α, and β, 
} 
calculate fitness       // create next generation 
preserve_best () 
crossover () 
mutation () 
alien () 
} 
// A is total number of attack records. B is total number of normal records. α is total number 
of attack records correctly identified as attack  β is total number of normal records 
incorrectly classified as attack (false positive). 
010 011 100 101 010 011 101 111 010 011 100 101  101 011 100 101 covert 
a=2 b=3 c=4 d=5 a=2 b=3 c=5 d=7 a=2 b=3 c=4 d=5   a  b   c   d  
               Attribute 1                             Attribute 2                            Attribute 3         Attribute 10 class 
Table 4. Suggested Fuzzy Logic Encoding For Each Attribute 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
In the first step of the proposed framework, we designed and configured a separate IPv6 
LAN topology network as shown in Figure 4 according to the network system environment 
requirements. A Security tool was created along with THC in (Hauser, 2015) to simulate 
different attacks in both protocols; IPv6 and ICMPv6 (Martin & Dunn, 2007), (Supriyanto et 
al. 2012).  
        We implemented the system using Weka 3.7 database system built with java 
programming Language and performed on personal computer with 3.1 GHz Inter core i5 CPU 
3450 and 8 GB RAM. With regards to the GA implementation, we focused on 10 sizes of the 
population for each generation, however each individual will present a possible detection rule, 
and we chose two best individuals or rules, in which should have the highest fitness value from 
the present generation. We used uniform random as a selection method to select the parent in 
crossover process, this is to identify the members of the new generation, finally applying the 
single-point crossover in which will give the implemented rate of 20% for alien and 30% for 
mutation. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The training dataset contained 11 attributes or features including the one target value 
or labelled class either normal or attack (covert) as shown in Table 6. We performed two 
experiments; first test was for the known attacks simulated from rules using Fuzzy Genetic 
Algorithm depicting two main attacks DoS and Probe using the primary dataset as a test data. 
In the second test, we evaluated our approach on a bench mark data such as Network Simulation 
Language Knowledge Data Discovery (NSL-KDD’99) choosing 20 % of the dataset for testing 
phase in order to detect known and unknown attacks (Tavallaee et al. 2009). 
 
 
 
Attack Test Case Performed Commands 
Payload fields covert 
channels 
-send(IPv6(dst= 
"2001:db6:675c:7000::1") 
/IPv6DestOpt(options= 
[PadN(optdata=("22222222") 
)]+[PadN(optdata= 
("3333333333333333"))]) / 
ICMPv6EchoRequest(id=1)) 
Covert channel Using PadN 
Option 
-IPv6DestOpt(type=02data= 
”YYYYY”)/icmpechorequest 
Fig 3. A Fuzzy Logic Trapezoidal Represented Four 
Parameters; A ≤ B ≤ C ≤   D.  
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Table 5: Sample of Simulated Attacks Using 
Covert Channels in IPv6 
 Algorithm 3 The Fuzzy logic to identify 3 known attacks. 
 
{ 
If (dos_rule =1 || probe_rule=1 || R2L=1) 
It is attack; 
else if 
       If (dos_rule = 0 || probe_rule= 0 || R2L= 0) 
 
it is normal; 
end if 
} 
 
 Experiment 1: The size of the primary dataset was not suitable to be used as testing 
data, so we chose 10 % for a training dataset in the first attempt consisted of 60,000 
instances, although the process focused on detecting the following attacks 
instances: 
o Probe 
o  Denial of Service (DoS) 
o  Root to Local (R2L). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first experiment results shown in Table 7 and the graph in Figure 4, we observe 
significant accuracy rates of the suggested approach detecting; DoS training dataset by 95.3%, 
the Probe attack detection by 96.8%, and R2L accuracy detection by 97.7% with a false positive 
rate by 3.7%. However when we performed the testing phase overall of the attack types the 
results have increased to 97.7% and the false positive decreased to 1.7% which shows a better 
performance and high accuracy improved by using  the suggested FG Algorithm.  
 
 
 
FFe2::1/64
FFe2::2/64
FFe2::3/64
FFe2::4/64
Linux Kali
Attacker
Switch
Router
FW
Internet
Linux Ubuntu
2001:db6:675c:7000::1/64
2001:db6:675c:7000::2/64
2001:db6:675c:7000::3/64
Windows 7
Linux Ubuntu
Win 7 Client
Unix Server
Win XP Client
Fig 4. Configured IPv6 LAN Network Topology 
to Perform Attack Simulation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Experiment 2: In order to extend the proficiency of the proposed model and to 
validate it, we used the NSL-KDD99 dataset (Tavallaee et al. 2009). This dataset 
was collected at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Lincoln Lab 
to evaluate intrusion detection systems, however it lacks instances of IPv6 attack 
types except the ICMPv4, and IP ID covert channels (Zander et al. 2007) which 
have similar principle techniques manipulating such attacks. McHugh and 
Mahoney in (Mahoney & Chan, 2003) criticized the DARPA dataset for not 
containing some background noise i.e. packet storms, strange packets, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We trained the fuzzy genetic algorithm on testing dataset in which 20% of the NSL-
KDD data was taken for this purpose. Each connection record consists of 41 features and 
labelled in order sequences such as: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7... 41 in addition to the 42nd attribute which is 
the assigned class; normal or anomaly. These attributes fall into four main categories as in 
(Mahoney & Chan, 2003), (Tavallaee et al. 2009). We chose 6 types of DoS instances, 4 attack 
types of Probe instances, and 4 types of R2L attack instances from the training dataset 
performing five test Cases C1, C2, C3,..,C5 for each category as shown in Table 8. We have 
tested 14 attack types as well as the normal connections. Considerably, we chose 4 types of the 
attacks as unknown attacks in the testing dataset in order to test our Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm 
(FGA). The attack types are; Neptune, Xmas Tree, Multihop, and Spy. Finally, we tested each 
type of attacks separately to examine and investigate the accuracy and to observe the 
performance of the detection method. See Table 8 for details of the testing cases results. 
R # TC FL HL PL NH SA Type Code RB PYL Class 
1 0 0 High Increased 0 0 0 1 0 1 Covert 
2 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
3 1 1 Moderate Descreased 1 1 0 0 0 0 Normal 
4 1 1 Moderate Decreased 1 1 0 1 0 0 Normal 
5 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
6 1 1 Moderate Decreased 1 1 0 0 0 0 Normal 
7 0 1 Moderate Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
8 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 0 0 1 1 Covert 
9 0 1 Moderate Unchanged 1 1 1 1 0 0 Covert 
10 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
Attack 
Name 
Attack 
Type 
Total 
Packets 
Test 
Data 
TPR 
% 
FPR 
% 
DR 
% 
Smurf DoS  
 
27,500 
 
 
 
10.000  
94.8 5.2  
 
 
95.3 
Pod DoS 95.8 4.2 
Teardrop DoS 97,8 2.2 
Covert 
Channels 
DoS 94,6 5.4 
Ipsweep Prob  
17,800 
 
 
8.000  
96.8 3.2  
96.8 Portsweep Prob 94,8 5.2 
Spy R2L  
14,700 
 
 
   5.000 
97.8 2.2  
 
97.7 
Stan R2L 95,9 4.1 
Multihop R2L 97.7 2.3 
Normal Normal 30.000 30.000 99.6 0.4 99.6 
Total Testing Rate  97.7 1.7  
Table 6: Analysis Output Format of Covert Channel Characteristics 
Table 7. Results of Primary Data Using 
FGA to Detect Different Attacks. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of both experiments confirm the initial hypothesis of our suggested Fuzzy 
Genetic Algorithm (FGA). The performance of the process was impressive with regards to the 
significant accuracy to each test experiments phases so far. In Table 7 and Figure 5, we observe 
the distinguished correctness and low false positive of the suggested mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   The test was carried out using our primary data which were generated from two security 
tools; our security tool written in Python and (THC) tool which was written in C (Hauser, 
2015).  The testing dataset was taken from the overall training dataset to perform the detection, 
moreover the accuracy is competitive with an average of 97.7 % of the total testing data and 
with 96.6 % for the training dataset. To validate the efficiency of the suggested technique, we 
performed the second experiment with another classification algorithm; Naïve Bayes classifier. 
Obviously, this step gave us an indication of potential improvement of our suggested approach. 
 
 
# Data Type Category C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
1 Smurf DoS x  x   
2 Pod DoS x   x  
3 Teardrop DoS x     
4 Jping DoS  x    
5 UDP Flood DoS   x  x 
6 neptune DoS  x   x 
7 Ipsweep Prob    x  
8 Portsweep Prob  x   x 
9 Hostscan Prob    x  
10 Xmas Tree Prob  x  x  
11 Spy R2L   x   
12 Satan R2L   x   
13 ftp_write R2L  x  x  
14 Multihop R2L   x   
15 Normal 
Status 
Normal      
TC Data Type Nive Bayes  
DR (%) 
Av 
(%) 
FGA 
   DR(%) 
Av (%)  
 
 
   1 
Neptune 92.4  
 
91.15 
97.8  
 
96.37 
Xmas Tree 91.7 96.1 
Multihop 90.7 93.1 
Spy 89.8 98.5 
 
2 
 
Jping 88.6  
61.9 
98.4  
95.6 UDP Flood 28.6 94.8 
Pod 68.5 93.6 
 
3 
Ipsweep 55.3  
64.46 
94.6  
94.03 Portsweep 93.6 92.4 
Hostscan 44.5 95.1 
 
4 
Smurf 95.6  
91.75 
90.5  
90.3 Satan 87.9 90.1 
 
5 
Teardrop 67.3  
72.3 
89.9 91.65 
ftp_write 77.3 93.4 
Table 8. Suggested Five Test Cases To Detect 
Attacks Using Hidden Channels. 
Table 9. Results of Suggested Fuzzy Genetic 
Algorithm (FGA) Results Using Five Test 
Cases 
    
 
  
           To Analyze the results given in Table 9 and the Graph in Figure 6, we compared the 
outcome (DR) of the Test Cases observing that only one test case (TC4), which we used Naive 
Bayes classifier was better than FGA. However in test cases TC1, TC2, TC3 and TC5, FGA 
was improved exclusively and depicted the unknown attacks with the highest accuracy 
detection rate (DR) by 96.37 %, meanwhile Naïve Bayes algorithm obtained an average of 
detection rate of 91.15 % in test case 1 with differences of 5.22 %, then in test case 2 Naive 
Bayes obtained 61.9 % accuracy in detection rate, while the FGA accuracy detection rate was 
95.6 % with over 33.7 % differences in DR. 
Significantly, Naive Bayesian Algorithm gave a low detection rate in test case 3 with the 
difference of 29.84 % obtaining 64.46\% accuracy, but FGA obtained in the same test case 
over 94.03 %.  Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm has an overall detection rate with 93.59 % running on 
NSL-KDD’99 dataset in the second experiment, while getting 97.7 % in the first experiment 
using our primary generated attack data types. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Similar to what Fries (2008) and Jongsuebsuk et al. (20013) suggested for TCP/IPv4 
attacks, new attempts required to detect storage covert channels and anomaly attacks in 
TCP/IPv6 using Artificial Intelligence Techniques in respond to the novel vulnerabilities in 
this protocol. Potentially, this approach should act as a countermeasure restrain to sophisticated 
attack tools used by hackers. Using Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm to tackle such network threats in 
IPv6 and ICMPv6 protocols will add a new route of cutting-edge solutions for security systems 
in the real world.   We have answered the project question about the possibility to detect and 
mitigate unknown and new attacks through covert channels manipulation using Artificial 
Fig 5. Results of Suggested FGA Framework 
to Detect Covert Channels 
Fig 6. Results of Unknown Attack Detection 
Testing NSL-KDD Dataset Using Suggested 
FGA Framework 
Intelligence techniques. However approaches in (Supriyanto et al. 2012), Salih et al. (2015), 
(Liu & Lai, 2009), (Redhwan et al. 2013), (Bahaman et al. 2011) dealing with IPv6 security 
sophisticated threats have some concerned issues as mentioned in (Salih et al. 2015). 
 In this paper, we applied an enhanced Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm (FGA) approach to 
suggest a novel IDS for IPv6/ICMPv6. We implemented a hybrid Genetic and Fuzzy rules due 
to the fast, flexible and high performance given to detect unknown attacks (Hogue et al. 2012) 
and covert channels in IPv6. Furthermore we proposed 10 characteristics of different attack 
instances against this New Generation Internet Protocol. This proposed approach in FGA 
heterogeneously reduces the probabilistic stimulation, which leads to higher accuracy in 
detection and classification process, because the Fuzzy Genetic Algorithm is a rule-based, 
consequently leads to less computation time, lower false negative rate (FNR) and higher true 
positive rate (TPR) in comparison to other tested MLA techniques. 
Future work will focus on the MITM attack detection to examine the certainty and 
specificity of the features selected in the primary dataset. Aiming to use an enhanced Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) in a supervised learning approach and compare it against our current 
approach to see the efficiency and the performance of both methodologies. However an SVM 
can only identify simple features (Sohn et al. 2003), it’s unlikely to detect complex values in 
IPv6 header fields and the embedded (Wendzel et al. 2015) inter-dependencies without other 
advanced techniques. This will reduce and eliminate partially the unauthorized access and its 
side effects on classified data communication using IPv6. 
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